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SUMMARY: The ‘‘Labour Question’’, a well-known obsession pervading the archives
of Africa, was posed by colonial rulers as a calculated question of scarcity and
coercion. On the Spanish plantation island of Fernando Pó the shortage and
coercive recruitment of labour was particularly intense. This article examines two
distinct clandestine labour recruitment operations that took hold of Rio Muni and
eastern Nigeria, on the east and the north of the Bight of Biafra. The trails of the
recruitment networks were successfully constructed by the specifically aligned
‘‘mediators’’ of kinship, ethnicity, money, law, commodities, and administration.
The conceptual focus on flat ‘‘mediators’’ follows Bruno Latour’s sociology of
associations and has been set against the concept of an ‘‘intermediary’’ that serves to
join and uphold the structure/agency and global/local binaries.
A disappearing Spanish Empire had wedged itself into the Bight of Biafra.
Charted by Portuguese navigators and bound by the slave trade, this corner
of the Atlantic was for the first two-thirds of the twentieth century
embroiled in the colonial struggle for ‘‘manpower’’. The so-called ‘‘Labour
Question’’, a well-known obsession pervading the archives of Africa, was
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(1930–1975)’’. I am most grateful for the generous suggestions and corrections of Alexander
Keese, Andreas Eckert, Sabine Scheuring, Ineke Phaf-Rheinberger, and Joel Glasman, and of
course to the editors of the present Special Issue. Most of the sources referenced are from one
Spanish archive, for which the following abbreviations have been used: AGA 5 Archivo
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posed by colonial rulers as a calculated question of scarcity and coercion. In
Spanish Guinea the shortage and compulsory recruitment of labour was
unusually pronounced. On the island of Fernando Pó la cuestión bracera
had revived the economic logic of the Caribbean plantation. With the
indigenous Bubi population decimated by disease and forced labour, the
island’s economy came to depend on imported braceros – the Spanish term
for agricultural contract workers derived from the word for arms. Towards
the end of the Atlantic slave trade and the long imperial nineteenth century,
these braceros included Cuban political prisoners and freed slaves, ‘‘coolie’’
workers from China, itinerant Kru sailors from the Windward Coast con-
tracted into bondage, and, most infamously, tens of thousands of indentured
labourers from Liberia.
Recruitment and even labour migration to the sole remnant of equatorial
Spanish colonialism, by then reduced to the size of Belgium, was explicitly
prohibited by all other European empires. The labour supply from the
Republic of Liberia was cut off in 1930 after a well-publicized intervention
by the International Labour Organization (ILO), whereupon the obscure
colony became popularly known, from Monrovia to Geneva and from
London to Lagos, as ‘‘the island of no return’’. Surrounded by boycotts and
their own notoriety, the planters on Fernando Pó, who were producing
about 2 per cent of the world’s cacao, sought out underground labour
suppliers in an attempt to scramble themselves out of the paralysing labour
shortage on the island. As the archival material unearthed here will show,
planters relied on two distinct and successive clandestine labour recruitment
operations in Rio Muni and Nigeria to the east and north of the Bight of
Biafra. The scale of clandestine recruitment was, in its region, period, and
proportionate dimension, unparalleled.1
In 1926 Fernando Pó turned to its continental exclave Rio Muni, and
transformed the border zones with Gabon and Cameroon into a labour
reserve for Spanish recruiters. What Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch called
‘‘the plague of recruiters’’ unleashed decades earlier across the hinterlands
of resource-extraction works in central and southern Africa reached
Rio Muni with a time-lag, and a vengeance.2 As a Spanish territory, it had
1. The techniques used by the island’s recruiters, which at the least can be described as auda-
cious and cunning, have their parallels throughout colonial constellations of capital and labour.
See, especially, Alan Jeeves, Migrant Labour in South Africa’s Mining Economy: The Struggle
for the Gold Mines’ Labour Supply, 1890–1920 (Johannesburg, 1985); the Peru case study in
Tom Brass, Towards a Comparative Political Economy of Unfree Labour (London, 1999); and
the case study of a plantation island in New Guinea in Marcel van der Linden, Workers of the
World: Essays Toward a Global Labor History (Leiden, 2008), pp. 339–358.
2. Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, ‘‘The Colonial Economy of the Former French, Belgian and
Portuguese Zones, 1914–35’’, in Adu Boahen (ed.), General History of Africa, VII, Africa Under
Colonial Domination 1880–1935 (Paris [etc.], 1985), pp. 351–382, 363; André Gide, Voyage au
Congo (Paris, 1927), p. 72.
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been a haven for Fang escaping German and French forced-labour
regimes, but in just a few years the Spanish were close to subjecting the
entire male population of working age to forced labour on the mainland
and to contract labour on the island. The first part of this essay covers the
period of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship and the Second Republic,
which lasted from 1931 to 1936, and will document the free rein given to
private recruiters and their lawless methods, to which the Spanish
authorities turned a (permissive) blind eye. The labour reforms initiated
at the end of the short-lived republic led to the dispersal of the Spanish
recruiters of Rio Muni and prompted the transition to complete depend-
ence on Nigerian recruiters.
The second part of the essay traces the recruitment constellation that
took hold of Nigeria’s eastern provinces. From Calabar and Victoria to
Santa Isabel, the trickle of small traders and recruiters, using counterfeit
papers on ferry boats, turned into a wholesale smuggling network on
canoes which brought over tens of thousands of Ibibio and Igbo workers.
The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War left the then fascist island of
Fernando Pó financially and diplomatically isolated until the end of
World War II, which entrenched the illegal canoe trade along the sharpest
edge of the Bight of Biafra. Around 1940, in the aftermath of the Great
Depression in Nigeria, and with Calabar’s merchants seeking profitable
new ventures, the proportion of illegally recruited workers stood,
astoundingly, at 10 per cent of Nigeria’s wage-employed population.3
Even in the post-World-War-II decades, the amount of migrant labour,
disenfranchized and doubly discriminated against in Spanish Guinea, was
large enough to contradict Frederick Cooper’s or Carolyn Brown’s
positing of the late colonial period as a time when wage labourers turned
to nationalist protest and claimed entitlements through orthodox class-
based means.4
While only the ‘‘long decade’’ of the 1930s falls within the scope of this
essay, this important period signals the beginning of labour reforms in
most African colonies, as labour departments and protective legislation
were widely introduced after a spate of ILO treaties on forced labour, and
3. Heinrich Wieschhoff, Colonial Policies in Africa (Philadelphia, PA, 1944), p. 38; Granville
St John Orde-Browne, Labour Conditions in West Africa (London, 1941), p. 79. The figure in
1938 for those in waged employment was 182,600, of which 50,000 each were employed in
mines and government, in a Nigerian population of 21 million. For mines, see William Freund,
‘‘Labour Migration to the Northern Nigerian Tin Mines, 1903–1945’’, Journal of African
History, 22 (1981), pp. 73–84.
4. Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and
British Africa (Cambridge, 1996), see esp. parts 2 and 4, as well as his ongoing research; Carolyn
A. Brown, ‘‘We Were All Slaves’’: African Miners, Culture, and Resistance at the Enugu
Government Colliery (Oxford, 2003). For an overview see Andreas Eckert, ‘‘Geschichte der
Arbeit und Arbeitergeschichte in Afrika’’, Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, 39 (1999), pp. 502–530.
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the recruitment of and contracts for ‘‘indigenous workers’’.5 In a pro-
gressivist narrative the interwar years would mark the transition from
unfree to free labour in African history.
In terms of labour recruitment, empires in Africa sought to shorten the
distance from the Asian-based indentured labour market and to hasten the
end of their ‘‘initial’’ – drawn-out and recurring – stage of administratively
directed forced labour. The replacement would be a framework where
employers could hire voluntary workers under the guidance of state-
regulated international conventions and licensed agencies. The two
recruitment constellations examined here fall into neither of those temporal
‘‘stages’’ because they cannot be categorized by the binary pairs of
free/unfree and legal/illegal correlated by the modern state. That constant
and shady borderland was home to a para-state, quasi-open market of
trafficking entrepreneurialism. By operating on the edges of the Bight of
Biafra the illegal recruiters circumvented the police state and disrupted
the institutionalization of regulated labour markets. They pocketed an
enormous share of the colonial economy of the island, which they also
underpinned. The recruiters were paid, but through a series of very
elaborate transactions they had to pay the costs of displacement, and every
cent and metre had to be accounted for.
The empirical tracing of the recruitment networks leads to a prolonged
focus on the institution of bridewealth in the Fang societies of Rio Muni and
the trading and merchant structures of the Igbo and Efik of south-eastern
Nigeria. The often underestimated role of kinship and ethnicity in structur-
ing labour migration and recruitment has been highlighted by Ravi Ahuja.
His unique research on South Asian maritime labourers has wonderfully
reconstructed how colonial ‘‘networks of subordination’’ were accompanied
by the ‘‘networks of the subordinated’’, that were neither ‘‘surviving elements
of pre-capitalist societies nor solely infrastructures of resistance’’.6 However,
as the empirical tracing of the recruitment networks includes the even more
often underestimated role of non-human actors, such as currencies, travel
documents, labour laws, and contraband goods, the theoretical inclination in
this piece relies on Bruno Latour’s sociology of associations rather than on
the conceptual reservoirs of social history.
Latour’s controversial method prohibits scientific ‘‘purification’’ that
reduces socio-technical processes to singular causes, such as the nature of
5. Only Portugal refused to even sign the ILO conventions of 1930, 1936, and 1939, and while
only Britain ratified them expeditiously, they carried a rhetorical and international legal weight.
See part 1 of Cooper, Decolonization and African Society.
6. Ravi Ahuja, ‘‘Networks of Subordination–Networks of the Subordinated: The Ordered
Spaces of South Asian Maritime Labour in an Age of Imperialism (c.1890–1947)’’, in Ashwini
Tambe and Harald Fischer-Tiné (eds), The Limits of British Colonial Control in South Asia:
Spaces of Disorder in the Indian Ocean Region (London, 2009), pp. 13–48, 33.
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the market or class, power, and imperialism. With Latour, phantom master
concepts are deflated and demystified to the extent that they can no longer
be causally posited ‘‘below’’, nor be used as shortcuts to explain deductively
almost everything else as mere effects, expressions, and reflections thereof.
In Latour’s laboratory the privileged lens that splits the abstract from the
concrete to attain largely hollow structures disintegrates and, as if with the
wave of a wand, hitherto passive actors and restricted contexts come to life
in ‘‘a world made of concatenations of mediators where each point can be
said to fully act’’. The magic comes from a flat ontology and a radicalized
empiricism that ‘‘tries to replace as many causes as possible by a series of
actors – such is the technical meaning of the word ‘network’’’.7
A ‘‘network’’ is not merely the loose and uninspiring middle ground
between structure and agency or the local and the global. In Latour’s
methodological terms, after ‘‘localizing the global’’ and, with equal weight,
‘‘dislocalizing’’ or ‘‘redispatching the local’’, comes the work of ‘‘connecting
sites’’. Even though Latour rejects the term ‘‘actor-network theory’’,
preferring instead a magmatic totality of a ‘‘plasma of actants’’, he endorses
its famous acronym. ANT encapsulates his methodological maxim: to
follow the actors, and to do it as painstakingly as ants might, had they
been set to work on the shelves of an archive. An ANT approach has
been enabled by the Africa collection in the Spanish archive as it is actually
‘‘un-archived’’: the bulk of the documentation was never filtered or indexed.
In this text, the aim has not been to mirror the already purified form of
the well-structured colonial reports occasionally encountered, but, with
the sources of all scales side by side, to reflect in method, map-making,
and writing, the data cascades contained in a series of archival sheets, files,
and boxes.
R I O M U N I O V E R R U N B Y R E C R U I T E R S , 1 9 2 6 – 1 9 3 5
In the main square in Santa Isabel there once stood a statue of Governor
Ángel Barrera signing the 1914 labour treaty with Liberia, surrounded by
the Gothic cathedral, the mission, the Governor’s Palace, and the offices of
the John Holt Company. The treaty was briefly renounced by Liberia
in 1926, and finally annulled in 1929, after which a fact-finding ILO
7. Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Oxford,
2005), p. 59. This network-theory direction is a response to the insistent cues of Frederick
Cooper’s critique of the term ‘‘global’’, found in its most programmatic form in Frederick
Cooper, ‘‘Back to Work: Categories, Boundaries and Connections in the Study of Labour’’, in
Peter Alexander and Rick Halpern (eds), Racializing Class, Classifying Race: Labour and
Difference in Britain, the USA and Africa (London, 2000), pp. 213–232, and idem, ‘‘Networks,
Moral Discourse, and History’’, in Thomas Callaghy, Ronald Kassimir, and Robert Latham
(eds), Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power (Cam-
bridge, 2001), pp. 23–46.
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Figure 1. Map of the Bight of Biafra in 1940. For Nigeria all five eastern provinces, including the
Cameroons, a British Mandated Territory, are visible. Each province was subdivided into
several divisions, whose borders are not drawn, although their relevant headquarters are. The
circles indicate the origin of Nigerian braceros by division. The road network is a good proxy
for population density. For Fernando Pó, land use is to actual size.8
8. The map of Nigeria in 1940 is adapted from ‘‘A Ten-Year Plan of Development and Welfare
for Nigeria’’, National Archives of the UK, London: Public Record Office [hereafter, TNA,
PRO], CO 657/53. The maps of Spanish Guinea are adapted from Jaime Nosti Nava, Notas
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commission discovered that contract workers had ‘‘been recruited under
conditions of criminal compulsion scarcely distinguishable from slave
raiding and slave trading’’.9 Liberia’s first treaty retraction cut the plantation
labour figures by half, and in response the new governor, General Miguel
Nuñez del Prado, orchestrated the military occupation of Rio Muni.
Before 1926, Spanish control on the mainland was limited to the coastal
towns and most of the 100 European residents had been German factory
shop owners and arms dealers who bought up hardwood, wild rubber, and
ivory. In the years that followed, with prestación personal (corvée) in lieu
of tax, some 500 kilometres of roads and bridges were built, dotted with
garrisons of the colonial guard. At any given moment, up to 4,000 Fang
were working unwaged on such public works, and the dictates of forced
labour meant that people were shuffled off to the plantations by the colonial
guards on any pretext of disobedience.10 Systematic disempowerment and
induced indebtedness were also fostered by the colonial courts, who sum-
marily distributed heavy fines or sentences of forced contract on Fernando
Pó, so that during the three months approaching the harvest season in 1926
some 4,500 braceros and 1,181 accompanying and working women were
sent there.11 Alongside such forced labour schemes, the aggravated labour
scarcity on the island activated a private recruitment industry.
geográficas, fı́sicas y económicas sobre los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea (Madrid,
1942), pp. 120–122. Data on the origin of Nigerian braceros can be found in C.W. Michie,
‘‘Labour Conditions in Spanish Guinea’’ (28 February 1941), TNA, PRO, FO 371/26908. Jaime
Nosti Nava, La agricultura en guinea española (Madrid, 1955), p. 153, writes that ‘‘at least fifty
per cent of contracted braceros are Ibo from Owerri’’. In 1940 18 per cent of the island was
under cultivation, 26,340 hectares or 71 per cent by Europeans, and 10,600 hectares or 29 per
cent by Africans. There were some 270 cacao producers, 100 of whom did not employ migrant
labour. See Günther Wolff, ‘‘Ein Beitrag zur Wirtschaft von Fernando Poo’’, Beiträge Zur
Kolonialforschung, 1 (1942), pp. 93–110.
9. ‘‘Slavery Conditions in Liberia’’, New York Times, 27 October 1930. See the foundational
work of Ibrahim Sundiata, From Slaving to Neoslavery: The Bight of Biafra and Fernando Po in
the Era of Abolition, 1827–1930 (Madison, WI, 1996), pp. 117–122.
10. Gustau Nerı́n, La última selva de España. Antropófagos, misioneros y guardias civiles:
Crónica de la conquista de los Fang de la Guinea Española, 1914–1930 (Madrid, 2010), p. 218. In
the early twentieth century there were other forced labour schemes also subjecting the indi-
genous Bubi populations of Fernando Pó. See Gonzalo Sanz Casas, ‘‘Los finqueros y el uso del
trabajo forzado en la agricultura colonial de la isla de Fernando Poo’’, Arxiu d’Etnografia de
Catalunya, 3 (1984), pp. 123–136; and Dolores Garcia Cantus’s ongoing research. The small
historical literature on Equatorial Guinea has focused almost exclusively on Fernando Pó and
on the pre-1930 period.
11. These women worked unwaged as cooks and cultivated food plots near plantations; GG to
DGMC, 12 October 1926, C-81/07646. For indictments against the entire colonial institutional
apparatus, see Curaduria to GG, 27 July 1932, C-81/8125, E-4; Nerı́n, La última selva de
España, p. 225. This is the only published work, beyond the very few sentences in other
publications, dealing with labour issues in Rio Muni. It does not, however, cover the activities
of the private recruiters.
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Reclutadores, ganchos, and the money trail
The start-up funds for the recruiter-entrepreneurs were easily provided
by wealthy planters. The 10,000 tonnes of cacao exports were guaranteed
to be sold in Spain at protectionist prices three times higher than the
global market rate.12 The existing harvest on the 36,000 hectares under
cultivation already filled the subsidized cacao quota, and so all that was
needed was to ring the labour-scarcity alarm and invoke the spectre of
rotting crops and a bankrupt colony to perpetuate the exploitation of a
just-in-time labour force that would be procured by any means necessary.
While a short-lived decree gave the Cámara Agrı́cola de Fernando Póo
(Agricultural Chamber of Commerce, hereafter Cámara) a recruitment
monopoly in Rio Muni that aimed ‘‘to avoid the recruitment of indigenous
workers being bastardized and converted into an illicit trade, to the benefit
of the recruiters’’, the allocation of any incoming labour by the Cámara
suited only the so-called aristocratic planters, consisting of the early Catalan
settlers, Spanish Cuban exiles, and the large corporate-owned plantations.
The owners of the other major plantations were Spanish, Portuguese,
German, and Fernandino – African immigrants originating from the nine-
teenth-century Portuguese Empire and British West Africa. Feeling their
own hands were tied, the planters decided to force through the reintro-
duction of ‘‘FREE RECRUITMENT as the only solution’’. In December
1927 the governor of Fernando Pó conceded and even extended ‘‘free
recruitment to all territories outside the colony’’.13
The new logging lobby of Rio Muni entered the fray over labour in the
late 1920s by denouncing the deleterious effects of the island’s recruiters,
both in demographic terms and for its own commercial interests. There
were fewer than 100,000 Fang in Rio Muni, and in 1930 80 per cent of the
5,000 annually contracted braceros were sent to the island.14 That pro-
portion was slowly being reversed as Fang workers much preferred
12. William Gervase Clarence-Smith, ‘‘African and European Cocoa Producers on Fernando
Póo, 1880s to 1910s’’, Journal of African History, 35 (1994), pp. 179–199, 197; Jordi Sant Gisbert,
‘‘El modelo económico colonial y sus contradicciones: Fernando Poo (1900–1936)’’, Afro-
Hispanic Review, 28 (2009), pp. 57–80, 65. In 1930 the Cámara blocked the granting of any
further land concessions for almost two decades. For a broad overview, see Alicia Campos
Serrano, ‘‘Colonia, derecho y territorio en el Golfo de Guinea: Tensiones del colonialismo
español en el siglo XX’’, Quaderni Fiorentini, 33 (2005), pp 1–27.
13. Sebastian Llompart Aulet, Legislación del trabajo de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de
Guinea (Madrid, 1946), p. 108; Finqueros to Cámara, 4 February 1927, AGA, C-81/08096,
E-28; Llompart Aulet, Legislación del trabajo, p. 109. For an overview of the conflict see
Gonzalo Sanz Casas, ‘‘Polı́tica colonial y organización del trabajo en la isla de Fernando Poo:
1880–1930’’ (Ph.D., University of Barcelona, 1983), pp. 241–248; and in the local media
‘‘+Monopolio, No? +Exlusiva, Si?’’, La Guinea Española, 25 March 1927.
14. For the census tables and much more, written up by a wizard of statistics and founder of a
Braudel-like structuralism in Spain, see Román Perpiñá Grau, De colonización y economı́a en la
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employment in the closer and better-paying expanding logging conces-
sions of Rio Muni. With the final withdrawal of Liberian workers, the
labour shortage on the island peaked. In the speculation and bidding wars
for braceros, the commission paid by the cacao planters of Fernando Pó to
the recruiters rose from 50 pesetas in 1926 to 500 and even to 800 pesetas
in 1931, of which 200–300 pesetas was pure profit. Considering that the
average income of Europeans was 500 pesetas a month, that ‘‘margin of
profit actively sustain[ed] a large army of intermediaries, direct and
indirect, who by all possible means made sure they directed the workers
to ensure the best agricultural interests of the island’’.15
There were at least 60 European reclutadores operating at any one time.
Professional recruiters could sign off up to 100 braceros a month at the
Curaduria (labour office) in Bata, whereas the part-timers could manage
around 10 braceros. The latter group of reclutadores, more numerous,
were start-up planters ‘‘who found in this activity the resources to cover
the costs of running their coffee plantations’’ until the seedlings grew
large enough to bear fruit, which would take at least three years.16 The
first coffee plantations were dotted along the new road between Bata
and Mikomeseng, and land concessions were more readily granted than
private credit. In contrast to other European colonies, there were no
immigration restrictions to Spanish Guinea to discourage – to use early
twentieth-century census categories – ‘‘undesirable’’ Europeans of the
‘‘vicious’’ classes from settling.
During the 1920s the colony experienced an economic boom and
‘‘served as a landfill site for Spaniards of the worst class who wanted to
enrich themselves, quickly and easily’’, who wanted to ‘‘prosper and find a
fortune’’.17 The reclutadores are described by Republican and Victorian
authors as ‘‘callous, sleazy [and] spiritually barren’’, and, in one recruiter’s
own words, they were ‘‘merciless and criminal’’.18 Their methods were
‘‘legally prohibited but perfectly known’’.19 In Rio Muni the recruiters not
Guinea Española: Investigación, sobre el terreno, de la estructura y sistema de colonización en la
Guinea Española (Barcelona, 1945), p. 101.
15. Cámara Bata to GG, 11 August 1931, AGA, C-81/8095, E-17. In the late 1930s, 20 per cent
of labour costs disappeared into recruiters’ pockets, 20 per cent covered wages, 45 per cent went
into imported food rations, and the remainder went for housing, sickness, death, and flight;
Román Perpiñá Grau, ‘‘Mano de Obra Africana: Factor de coste colonial’’, Cuadernos de
Estudios Africanos (1947), pp. 127–144, 128.
16. Curador to GG, 16 June 1931, C-81/08125, E-2.
17. A. Victor Murray, The School in the Bush: A Critical Study of the Theory and Practice of
Native Education in Africa (London, 1929), p. 25; Guillermo Cabanellas, ¡Esclavos!: Notas
sobre el África negra (Valencia, 1933), p. 19.
18. Curador to GG, 16 June 1931; Francisco Madrid, La Guinea incógnita: Vergüenza y
escándalo colonial (Madrid, 1933), p. 89.
19. GG to DGMC, 28 December 1935, AGA, C-81/06867, E-5.
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only had free rein over Africans, but even established a mafia-like power of
intimidation over European managers and administrators, even to the point
of assaulting the labour officer if he dared question the true age of a bracero
or the legitimacy of a contract’s ‘‘signing’’. Some recruiters also operated
illegal rackets to import alcohol and rifles, essential items needed by all the
recruiters entering into negotiations with the local chiefs.20
The crucial interlocutors between all these mediators of the money
trail were the ganchos (runners or literally ‘‘hooks’’). Each reclutador
operated with up to six ganchos, who were usually skilled labourers or
employed as foremen in the Rio Muni plantations. These African inter-
mediaries tended to be Kombe and Balenke who lived in the Bata area and
had acted as porters in the first colonial expeditions. The coastal Ndowe
groups had some trading and marital relations with the Fang, whose
territory began at Niefang, although there were tensions between
them, as after the end of the slave trade – which the Fang had largely
evaded – there was a history of the Fang displacing the Ndowe further
along the coast.21
Fang clan chiefs, regalos, and bridewealth
The recruiters operated with two related tools that mediated their work
of recruitment in a situation where there was no spontaneous market
for voluntary labour. First, the regalo – literally ‘‘gift’’ but actually a full
wage advance – used for the payment of bridewealth, and second, the
payoff of the African labour intermediary. In the African social history
literature that is less inclined to dwell on kinship, the practice of bride-
wealth and the figure of the collaborating chief are often tabooed and
demonized and then treated as if they were expected to have operated by
themselves.22 In such a detached functionalist view, the common com-
mercial and missionary reading of ‘‘women being bought’’ and ‘‘chiefs
selling the bachelors’’ takes over. Instead, with ethnographic patience and
by taking the long detours and time lapses that the archive allows, it
becomes possible to trace how labour recruitment was a product of
a continuous thread of translations between wage advances, colonial
20. Madrid, La Guinea incógnita, p. 89; Gustau Nerı́n, Un Guardia Civil en la Selva (Barcelona,
2008), p. 117.
21. Muakuku Rondo Igambo, Conflictos étnicos y gobernabilidad: Guinea Ecuatorial (Barce-
lona, 2006), pp. 30–41; Nosti Nava, Notas geográficas, pp. 51–60.
22. Even where the focus on the sites of wage labour has been dispersed to the home and
hinterlands, as for example in chs 3 and 4 of Brown, We Were All Slaves, on recruitment in
Eastern Nigeria, she does not dwell for long on the non-industrial ethnographic literature. The
main works employed here, alongside the available sources, are Jane Guyer, Marginal Gains:
Monetary Transactions in Atlantic Africa (Chicago, IL, 2004), pp. 27–49; Jonathan Parry and
Maurice Bloch (eds), Money and the Morality of Exchange (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 1–29.
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currencies, monetized bride-prices, the colonial state, and chiefly accu-
mulation. In non-coastal Equatorial Africa it
[y] was not only a calculation and political power that created the spatial
geography of exchange but also the ideology of transformation that undergirded
it. The capacity to define, institutionalize, take advantage of, technically control,
and symbolically represent conversions is at the heart of the extensive regional
transaction systems that every autonomous polity built up in the stepwise
relations that connected the interior to the changing currency flows of the great
trade routes.23
Of course, such conversions or translations, tightly binding together
money, gender, and power across different polities, were not always
indispensable for labour recruitment. With state-directed forced labour,
non-dialectical violence worked. To be sure, the private recruiters man-
aged to break into the scene only after two sweeping acts of foundational
colonial violence, namely military pacification and the imposition of a
new colonial currency as a measure of value. Alongside the ongoing
military invasion, recruiters often dressed up in uniform or otherwise
made use of the aura of intimidation derived from systematic police
brutality to hoax and coax entire villages. Alongside the imperial occu-
pation, the Spanish colonial authorities prohibited the use of previous
currencies. A proletarianizing poll tax was not yet in place, but the peseta
coin came to be quickly translated by the Fang for the purpose of
bridewealth payments.24
In several sources the ganchos and the reclutadores unanimously
describe the process of recruitment in formulaic terms. They would drive
along the Bata to Ebebiyin Road, on or near to which the Fang population
had been told to relocate their ‘‘villages, strung out like beads upon the
arteries of commerce by the colonial administration’’.25 The ganchos
would inquire in a mix of Fang and Pidgin English if any men could be
supplied. The resident chief would categorically answer in the negative
until a sufficient combination of cash and goods were promised – the
expected rate was 100 pesetas – and would include items such as salt,
23. Guyer, Marginal Gains, p. 39. For a similar stepwise analysis of the emergence of a labour
market in a nearby logging industry, see Christopher Gray and François Ngolet, ‘‘Lambaréné,
Okoumé and the Transformation of Labor along the Middle Ogooué (Gabon), 1870–1945’’,
Journal of African History, 40 (1999), pp. 87–107.
24. Fernando Muakuku Rondo Igambo, Guinea Ecuatorial: De la esclavitud colonial a la
dictadura nguemista (Madrid, 2000) p. 48; Nerı́n, La última selva de España, pp. 225, 249;
Guyer, Marginal Gains, p. 30. In the early twentieth century currencies included iron arrow-
heads, tobacco, guns, and German and French money.
25. James Fernandez, ‘‘Fang Representations under Acculturation’’, in Philip D. Curtin (ed.),
Africa and the West: Intellectual Responses to European Culture (Madison, WI, 1974), pp. 3–48,
17.
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tobacco, textiles, a bottle of brandy or wine, or even a rifle. To seal the
deal, a 300 peseta on-the-spot regalo was advanced to anyone signing up
for contract labour. The recruiters negotiated and spoke in commercial
situations and terms, and in the sources they hardly reflect on how they
unwittingly mobilized labour through the extensive mediations of cur-
rencies and polygamist clan chiefs.
Fortunately, there is a subaltern reflection in a singular interview
transcript dated July 1931. The first republican labour officer, branded
a Bolshevik by the planters, took it upon himself to ask each of the
165 braceros who were waiting at his Curaduria for the steamship to Santa
Isabel how they had been recruited. The majority said they had come
because of the 300-peseta regalo for comprar mujer, the adopted Hispa-
nicized term for bridewealth, or literally ‘‘buy wife’’, which was needed to
fund a marriage either for themselves or a brother, or required to settle the
debt of a divorced sister or mother.26 Of those interviewed, about one-
quarter admitted to being French subjects, who had then illegally crossed
the border with a gancho as they were attracted to the lower bride-prices
in Rio Muni.27
Marriage was strictly exogamic to the patrilineal descent group or clan.
A series of intermarrying clans would tend to form a grouping, such as the
Ntumu Fang who lived in the northern half of Rio Muni, southern
Cameroon, and the Woleu-Ntem province of Gabon.28 While at that time
there was no overarching authority between clans, nor any institution of
slavery, there was considerable economic inequality and intense prestige
competition between clans, and both were heightened by the influx of
recruiters. For any important social events between Fang clans, men
engaged in a performative bilaba, a milder type of potlatch, or ‘‘total
prestation’’, that required an exorbitant but ‘‘honourable level’’ of gift-
giving by the hosts.29
26. Curaduria Bata, July 1931, AGA C-81/8125 E-2; of the braceros in the group 20 per cent
were under the age of fifteen.
27. There were several thousand French-African subjects in Spanish Guinea. France had
denounced illegal recruitment before the League of Nations almost annually between 1929 and
1933, and encroaching ganchos were given ten-year prison sentences in Duala and Libreville;
GG to DGMC, 28 December 1935, AGA C-81/06867, E-5. See Maurice Mveng, ‘‘Note sur
l’emigration des Camerounais à Fernando Po entre les deux guerres mondiales’’, Abbia,
23 (1969), pp. 35–43.
28. Clans, made up of discontinuous family-based hamlets, were of highly variable size but
tended to fall into the three-figure range. The Ntumu Fang are a subgroup of the Fang, who in
turn are subcategorized into the broader linguistically defined Beti-Pahuin peoples. See Wiki-
pedia or Georges Balandier, The Sociology of Black Africa: Social Dynamics in Central Africa
(New York, 1970); Augusto Panyella, Esquema de etnologı́a de los fang ntumu de la Guinea
Española (Madrid, 1959).
29. Nerı́n, Un guardia civil en la selva, pp. 90–96; Guyer, Marginal Gains, pp. 40–41; Balandier,
The Sociology of Black Africa, p. 28.
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The most substantial way to increase food production and the network
of alliances was through, in Lévi-Straussian terms, the exchange of
women. Marriage was an exchange of female labour and reproductive
potential. A son without a sister could not have a wife, and wives worked
more than sisters and much more than men.30 Paying the bride-price was
not an act of buying, as a wife could usually neither be ‘‘sold on’’ nor
converted into common commodities. Also, a married woman remained
strongly linked to her lineage and, as solidarity in kinship was extended to
the entire lineage and clan, should a woman become divorced the money
to reimburse the bridewealth would be acquired by one of her brothers.
This was the situation for one-third of the respondents.
Divorce rates were on the increase, as due to the rising bride-prices
remarriage was a more lucrative option for a wife-giving clan. It tended to
be only the nkukuma or ‘‘clan chief’’ – a recent term for the title, meaning
‘‘wealthy’’ in Fang – who could afford the new bride-price and who
would accumulate wives. When the gancho arrived, the nkukuma would
either marry off wives or collect the outstanding debt of another clan who
had already received one of his wives, effectively leaving him with the
300-peseta regalo of the recruit in addition to the 100-peseta bonus. That
was the case with half the respondents, most of whom also said that their
brides had been accompanied to their patrilocal villages by one of her new
in-laws, as otherwise they feared she would suffer harassment or be
tempted to remain on Fernando Pó doing alternative work. Polygamy
was not a matter of increasing the labour input of the village economy, for
the increase in the practice as well as the act of ‘‘selling on’’ divorced wives
were innovations boosted by the recruiting process.31
In terms of the usual categories of labour mobilization, rather than
opposing them or stipulating a hidden ‘‘articulation’’ between them – that
is to say between the domestic mode of production or acquiring labour
through marriage, and the capitalist or contractual wage relationship –
both can be seen as a continuous translation between non-equivalent
30. In the basic stereotype, women would work the subsistence farms and market goods, while
men would help in the yearly slash-and-burning of a new plot, raise domestic animals, and fish
or hunt; Joaquı́n Mbana, Brujerı́a fang en Guinea Ecuatorial (Madrid, 2004), pp. 13–24; Nosti
Nava, Notas geográficas, p. 51. Men also supervised children, engaged in craft metalworking,
and most famously in sculpting (and selling) biere, statuettes that guarded the ancestral bones
and which populate all ethnographic museums in Europe and even inspired Picasso’s first cubist
painting. See Guyer, Marginal Gains, p. 45, who adds that ‘‘to the Fang, the real value was in the
bones, not the statues’’.
31. Jack Goody, ‘‘Polygyny, Economy and the Role of Women’’, in idem (ed.), The Character
of Kinship (Cambridge, 1974), pp. 175–190. This procedure, in which the chief controls the
circulation of women to mobilize a labour force for capital, forms a basis of the articulation of
modes of production theory in anthropology. See Claude Meillassoux, Femmes, Greniers et
Capitaux (Paris, 1975).
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bridewealth and equivalent abstract labour, standardized through quan-
tifiable colonial money across cultural norms. Such translations, which
drove the recruitment of remunerated unskilled braceros, in turn depen-
ded on the monetization by legislative fiat of the reproduction of Fang
socio-economic life. With the sudden prohibition of other currencies and
the forced introduction of the peseta, within just a few years the bride-
price had risen from about 50 pesetas to 300 in 1929, at which point this
price became fixed by government decree. However, as one of the recruits
told the labour officer, the 300 pesetas was the bride-price only for a
‘‘divorced woman belonging to a chief’’. Like several others among those
interviewed, the recruit had given the regalo to his family to save for the
500-peseta bride-price for a wife acquired directly from an almost
extortionist future father-in-law. The state’s monetary policy and ‘‘price
regulation’’ was crucial to speeding up the regalo method of recruitment
as it stabilized both the powerful intermediary position of the chiefs and
the burgeoning labour costs for the employer.
Trickery, the work contract, and fines
The ganchos and braceros interviewed also revealed some of the tricks of the
reclutadores, on whose actions the somewhat spineless backbone of the
recruitment system was based. Ganchos were told to pretend that they were
recruiting for the logging industry in Rio Muni or otherwise to claim falsely
that they were working for a reputable planter in a ‘‘good area’’ located near
a town and with no sleeping sickness. The most appallingly deceitful
method employed by the recruiters was to refer to the 300-peseta wage
advance as a regalo. Over half the recruits were induced to believe that the
regalo was literally a gift, while to those who knew full well that the regalo
would be deducted from their pay the reclutadores insisted that due to the
scarcity of labour it was now indeed a ‘‘gift’’. The wages for a bracero on the
island were 20 pesetas a month, one-half of which was paid monthly, while
the remaining 240 pesetas were released at the end of a two-year contract. If
the braceros had not been saving their monthly wages, then at the expiry of
the contract the planters would force them to renew their contract to repay
the remaining 60 of the 300-peseta regalo.32
An employer could be chosen or changed only in the rarest of cases. To
top it off, the working day was measured by a foreman’s estimate of
‘‘a day’s work’’. Piecework was a managerial strategy that served to
replace constant supervision with occasional performative threats and
actual assaults that would often lead to 12-hour workdays shot through
32. Curaduria to GG, 28 November 1933, C-81/08126, E-21. In the case cited, the Labour
Officer refused to renew a debt-bondage-based contract, but the planter was outraged enough
to make it clear that this extortion was usual.
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with violence.33 Those features of the labour contract led to misery among
the workforce and sustained the high fees of the recruiters. The republican
labour officer in Rio Muni knew that the labour scarcity was not a matter
of some sort of conflicting African work ethic, but rather that it was
the paltry wages and the constant deductions from them, as well as the
isolating and brutalizing contract conditions, that kept potential workers
at bay. Colonial ‘‘laziness’’ tropes were popular merely in the colonial
metropole and the media, and were only intermittently appealed to to
legitimize violent exploitation.
Privatized recruitment in Rio Muni wound down in the final years of the
republican period. Fines were finally dealt out to reclutadores for violations of
the labour code (that since 1912 had prohibited payments to chiefs), and for
causing speculation by selling on individuals already recruited. The industry’s
profit margin was slashed, and while the recruiters and their emissaries and
accomplices disbanded, the highest bidders in Fernando Pó looked elsewhere.
In just a few years the number of braceros contracted to Fernando Pó’s
plantations from Bata dropped to fewer than seventy, while the desertion
rate among Fang labourers in Rio Muni increased.34 Eventually the regalo
wage-recruitment system was abolished altogether because of the escalation
in cases of ‘‘serial’’ recruits – those who continually went to different
recruiters or employers to receive the regalo only to disappear again.35
The republicans sought to ‘‘humanize recruitment and suppress inter-
mediaries’’, and to ‘‘attract rather than capture’’ wage labour, but in order
to ‘‘stimulate voluntary and spontaneous immigration’’, bridges needed
to be built for a surplus proletariat to cross closely policed imperial
borders.36 Those bridges were conveniently constructed by an ensemble
of Nigerian recruiters, as an outgrowth of stratified social groups and the
33. There is much evidence of this in the archives, and a good quarter of the planters and/or
their overseers could be described as brutal. For fines and working conditions see AGA, C-81/
08128, E-14; C-81/08129 E-2. On the anomalous position of Fernando Pó in West and Central
African colonial history, in terms of the long two-year labour contracts and the extremely harsh
vagrancy laws, see William Gervase Clarence-Smith, ‘‘Cocoa Plantations and Coerced Labor in
the Gulf of Guinea, 1870–1914’’, in Martin Klein (ed.), Breaking the Chains: Slavery, Bondage
and Emancipation in Modern Africa and Asia (Madison, WI, 1993), pp. 150–170.
34. Perpiñá Grau, ‘‘Mano de Obra Africana’’, p. 129. The figure in 1941 was very high; more
than 20 per cent fled once they had received the regalo; idem, De colonización y economı́a,
p. 365. The 1930s saw the complex disintegration/reinvention of Fang political life through the
alar ayong or ‘‘pan-clan’’ anti-colonial movement and the famous, drug-fuelled reformative
bwiti cult popular in the logging labour camps. See James Fernandez, ‘‘The Affirmation of
Things Past: Alar Ayong and Bwiti as Movements of Protest in Central and Northern Gabon’’,
in Robert Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui (eds), Protest and Power in Black Africa (New York,
1970), pp. 427–457.
35. Cámara Bata to GG, 30 July 1946, AGA, C-81/08130, E-1.
36. GG, 1 October 1934, AGA, C-81/08126, E-1; Curador to GG, 16 June 1931; DGMC to
GG, 4 June 1932, AGA, C-81/06415, E-2.
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continuing decline of the colonial economy of south-eastern Nigeria
during the long decade of the 1930s, from the Great Depression until the
end of World War II.
T H E N I G E R I A N C O N N E C T I O N , 1 9 3 5 – 1 9 4 5
From the Calabar coastline the silhouette of the volcanic peak of Fernando
Pó is clearly discernible on the horizon. The Nigerian recruiters navigating
the stretch to the island were a motley crew of former labourers and traders,
and professionalized gangs run by canoe-owning coastal merchants. While
the former continuously slipped in and out of small-scale recruitment, it was
the latter, the commercial elite of Calabar Province, who paved the way for
this clandestine sea lane across the bay, on both steamers and canoes. While
the traffic on such different vessels was simultaneous, there was a clear break
during the Spanish Civil War when the numbers of braceros arriving on
colonial ferry boats dried up, only to rise exponentially on the tide of large
sea-going canoes. In the post-Spanish-Civil-War section below, the social
structures within which the Nigerian recruiters operated are contrasted,
specifically between the kinship-based networks of Igbo traders and former
labourers and the patronage-based Efik wards in Calabar and the caste-class
axes of Ekpe, their ‘‘secret society’’.
Why both those groups of recruiters threw themselves at the opportunity
afforded by Fernando Pó’s planters can be understood only by constant
reference to the material consequences of the solidification of British colonial
rule and the palm oil depression, that is, the development of a transport
infrastructure which reversed the fortunes of canoe-owning middlemen as
well as the ‘‘remorseless decline’’ of prices for palm products offered to
farmers by the European import-export factories.37 Awaiting them at the
Curaduria in Santa Isabel were guaranteed payments of between 500 and 800
pesetas (or £10 to £16) per bracero delivered.38 Most of the commission being
profit, their activity was lucrative indeed; even the lower figure was the
equivalent of around 5 months’ work as an individual trader or a year’s work
on a plantation. In 1935 there were 5,000 Nigerians on the island, one-half of
whom were braceros.39 By 1940 some 10,000 Nigerians were under contract
37. Susan Martin, Palm Oil and Protest: An Economic History of the Ngwa Region, South-
Eastern Nigeria, 1800–1980 (Cambridge, 1988), p. 88. Martin deduces (p. 119) that in 1933 palm
oil was worth only 17 per cent of its barter terms of trade levels of 1912 and that Eastern
Nigeria was in a long depression between 1914 and 1945.
38. This was double the rate of recruiting agencies operating in other African colonies; see
Orde-Browne, Labour Conditions in West Africa, p. 11. For the largest recruitment treaty, in
the early 1930s the Union of South Africa paid the Portuguese Empire £5 per head for almost
100,000 labourers annually for 12-month contracts.
39. Nosti Nava, Notas geográficas, p. 20. Census data for the island’s resident Africans in 1936:
Bubi or Fernandino, 9,348; Rio Muni, 6,800; Nigeria, 4,819; French Cameroon, 4,200;
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in Spanish Guinea, a figure that had doubled by the final year of World
War II. In those years, during the period of tax collection in Nigeria, coin-
ciding with the cacao harvest and the canoe season between October and
March, the number of new contracts exceeded 1,000 per month.40
Including family members and other professions, two-thirds of the 40,000
residents on Fernando Pó were Nigerians, who for the most part had arrived
outside the purview of the British colonial authorities, either with the help
or through the deceit of recruiters.41 The displacement of mostly unmarried
braceros was accompanied by trafficking in sex workers. For many women
departing under the guise of a wife or daughter it was ‘‘not difficult to
imagine their ultimate occupation in Spanish territory’’.42 Fernando Pó was
a very male-centric place, with almost 80 per cent of West African and
European immigrants being men, whose hetero- and homo-socialities and
sexualities were quite at odds with domestic or missionary moralities.43
Ferry boats, bribes, and papers
From 1901 on it was forbidden for British West Africans to take up work
as plantation labourers in Spanish Guinea. The first Nigerian Labour
Ordinance in 1929 had included severe penalties for ‘‘unlicensed
recruiting for foreign territories’’, by which was meant Fernando Pó.44 In
São Tomé, 209; Liberia, 175; Sierra Leone, 155; Annobon and Corisco, 146. At that point most
non-Spanish African migrants were skilled labourers or traders of all sorts rather than braceros,
and were regarded with some hostility for not making themselves ‘‘useful’’ to the plantation
economy. See GG to DGMC, 12 June 1933, AGA, C-81/06467 E-19; ‘‘Hospitalidad Excesiva’’,
El Defensor de Guinea, 2 November 1933.
40. British Consul to GG, 10 July 1946, AGA, C-81/08130, E-1.
41. Akinjide Osuntokun, Equatorial Guinea –Nigerian Relations: The Diplomacy of Labour
(Ibadan, 1978), pp. 36–40. This book is the only published work dealing even partially with this
period, but Osuntokun had no access to the Spanish archives. For 1940s census data, see
Sebastian Llompart Aulet, Anuario estadistico de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea
(Madrid, 1945), p. 195; and Wolff, ‘‘Ein Beitrag zur Wirtschaft von Fernando Poo’’, p. 108.
42. Michie, ‘‘Labour Conditions in Spanish Guinea’’ (28 February 1941). The quotation is from
a 1943 newspaper article cited in David Pratten, The Man-Leopard Murders: History and
Society in Colonial Nigeria (Edinburgh, 2007), pp. 166–167. Calabar was the central recruiting
ground for prostitution networks that spanned Nigeria and British West Africa; see Laurent
Fouchard, ‘‘Urban Poverty, Urban Crime and Crime Control: The Lagos and Ibadan Cases,
1929–1945’’, in Steven J. Salm and Toyin Falola (eds), African Urban Spaces in Historical
Perspective (Rochester, NY, 2009), pp. 291–320, 300.
43. Llompart Aulet, Anuario estadistico, p. 29. For so-called ‘‘unnatural acts’’ between men on
the plantations, see British Embassy to Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 5 December 1945,
Archivos del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Madrid, Archivo Renovado [herafter, AMAE],
R 2370, E-11.
44. David Aworawo, ‘‘Decisive Thaw: The Changing Pattern of Relations between Nigeria
and Equatorial Guinea, 1980–2005’’, Journal of International and Global Studies, 1 (2010),
pp. 89–109, 95. The nine prosecutions in 1939 of illegal recruiters by the Calabar courts rose to
over 100 in 1941; British Consul to GG, 10 July 1946, AGA, C-81/08130, E-1.
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spite of the £500 fines or 5 years’ imprisonment, the illegal recruiters
were adept at outmanoeuvring the half-hearted attempts to police
them. In the early 1930s the role of the recruiters was to act as a
‘‘conductor of the recruits through the network spread by the police in
Nigeria to prevent their emigration’’, and they were akin to ‘‘publicity
agents for the island, not so much misrepresenting the conditions on the
island as failing to mention that employment conditions were unlike
Nigeria’’.45 The recruiters paid for ferry tickets, bribes, the necessary
counterfeit paperwork, and other travel expenses, but the recruits were
‘‘made to sign an I.O.U. acknowledging that should they fail to take up
contract on the island they would owe three pounds to the recruiter’’.46
Hundreds of new recruits arrived every month on the ferry boats,
but the IOU made backtracking on arrival prohibitively expensive for
them. Furthermore, being an immigrant without a work contract on
the island was not a legal option. In 1933 vagrancy laws, targeting
unemployed and self-employed migrants, established that those who did
not ‘‘seek work within 15 days’’ or pay for their own deportation should
be sent to the ‘‘disciplinary brigades’’ of the prisons and used as labour for
public works.47
In 1934 a petition signed by seventeen ‘‘Ibibio Boys’’ entitled ‘‘THE
ATROCITIES OF THE SPANISH IN FERNANDO POO’’ reached
the British Consul in Santa Isabel. The Consul visited the plantation from
which the complaint had emerged and after talking to the Nigerian
braceros he concluded that ‘‘their chief grievance seemed to me to be that
they had been tricked by the recruiters into farm work against their
wishes [y and expectation] to being apprenticed to some trade, and that
they had no share in the bonus paid by their employer to the recruiters’’.48
The first public alarm was raised in a letter to the editor in a 1936 issue of
the important journal the West African Review:
British Subjects in Africa have known freedom from slavery for nearly one
hundred years. We have seen Abyssinia and Liberia under reprimand for this
offence, yet little or nothing has been said about the trade still carried on by
Spain in her territories in the Gulf of Guinea. [y] The unlawful activities of
people employed by Spain to recruit men chiefly in Calabar and other parts of
45. T. Farley Smith, ‘‘Report on Employment of Nigerian Labour in Fernando Poo. Submitted
after a visit lasting from June 5th to July 4th, 1939’’, 21 September 1939, TNA, PRO, FO 371/
23171.
46. A.E. Yapp, ‘‘Report On Employment of British Coloured Labour in Fernando Po, as the
Result of a Visit made August 29th–September 1st, 1936’’, 17 September 1936, TNA, PRO, CO
554/105/3. An IOU, or ‘‘I Owe You’’, is an informal document acknowledging debt.
47. Llompart Aulet, Legislación del trabajo, p. 131. For the creation of this law, see GG,
‘‘Extranjeros en la Colonia’’, AGA, C-81/08156, E-6.
48. British Vice-Consul to the Resident of Calabar Province, 13 September 1934, TNA, PRO,
FO 458/126.
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Nigeria [y] is more than obvious in Fernando Poo, where there are thousands
of Ibos. [y] Cannot something be done to stop this illegal traffic in human
cargoes?
The letter was signed anonymously by ‘‘Salvador’’ (Saviour), but the
author was quickly arrested in Santa Isabel after a visiting correspondent
from the Nigerian Daily Times ‘‘Mr. J.S. Olu Georg who when a special
degree method was used on him, disclosed the name of the writer of the
article’’.49 Salvador was revealed to be Samuel Babington Macaulay, a
Fernandino from Lagos but born on the island, and from prison he
somehow managed to get hold of a typewriter and in a letter to the British
Vice-Consul claimed that ‘‘the boys thus recruited I am cocksure are
brought here through the aid of the falsified permits manufactured one
way or the other by the RECRUITERS’’.50
The British Consul General for the region was then sent on an investi-
gative tour of the island. The British captain of the steamer that took him
there showed him forged police permits, which acted as passports
for legitimate traders to embark on ships destined for Santa Isabel. The
forgeries ‘‘were very clever ones but not clever enough to deceive
the Captain who pointed out three slight errors in it’’. While on that day
the recruiter and the eighteen recruits ‘‘hastily and unceremoniously left
the ship’’, the British captain confessed that:
[y] the temptation held out to a [ship’s] Master was so alluring that even he
might fail. [The Captain] said if he wished to work with the recruiters he could
clear a 100 pounds every crossing. The passage money he said to Fernando Po
was 10/- [shillings]: any recruiter would readily pay him an extra 10/- or more
per head if he agreed to accept the boys illegally. He could carry 200 each
passage.51
In Calabar ‘‘vendors of second hand and forged passports made a
lucrative income’’.52 As for acquiring original permits, two recruiters from
49. Salvador, ‘‘Slavery in Spanish Guinea’’, West African Review, May 1936; ‘‘Sensational Arrest
at Fernando Po’’, Sierra Leone Daily Mail, 16 September 1936. The Salvador piece was rep-
rinted with a commentary by the media mogul and first president of Nigeria Nnamdi Azikiwe,
who noted ironically, ‘‘Let Fernando Po’s inhumanity be spotlighted. Let Spain explain its
slavery. But then Spain is a Colonial Power and a European State at that, which explains a lot’’;
Zik, ‘‘Inside Stuff: Fernando Po’’, The African Morning Post, 27 May 1936.
50. Samuel Babington Macaulay to British Vice-Consul, 30 August 1936, TNA, PRO FO 458/
127.
51. Yapp, ‘‘Report On Employment of British Coloured Labour’’, 17 September 1936. 20
shillings 5 £1. Similar observations can be found in W. Benson, ‘‘The Fernando Po Labour
Demand’’, February 1936, TNA, PRO, CO 554/105/3. See also W. Benson, ‘‘Some International
Features of African Labour Problems’’, International Labour Review, 39 (1939), pp. 34–45.
52. Rev. Ewart Shepherd, ‘‘Nigerian Labourers in Fernando Po: Dr. Haden Guest Mis-
informed? Allegations of Slavery Cannot Be Substantiated’’, West Africa, 19 May 1939.
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Eket ‘‘boasted [to the Consul] that they will never have trouble in Calabar
as they pay the Native Police Inspector WULOBI (or some such name)
1 pound per head’’.53 The dealers in paperwork also bought up and resold
‘‘permits of return’’, issued by the British Consulate in Santa Isabel, which
enabled new recruits to travel under the false names of those leaving the
island with no intention of returning.54 The Spanish colonial state was
‘‘lazy’’, and while the British attempted to regulate labour recruitment
by generating paperwork, documents were quickly forged, circulated,
or evaded by a series of mediators, to the detriment of a significant
proportion of Nigerian recruits, who while arriving voluntarily were not
expecting to encounter the desolate drudgery of the bracero.
The Spanish Civil War and the palm oil belt
Fernando Pó was overrun by Francoist mutineers in July 1936, the first
month of the Spanish Civil War. Within the next two years it was ‘‘impos-
sible to bring braceros from Calabar’’ as recruiters ceased their operations
since all foreign exchange was to be rerouted to Spain for the fascist front.55
During those years braceros were regularly forced to renew their contracts as
they were told by the Curaduria that ‘‘‘We got no money, You better go
back to work – contract for two more years – we will not let you walk in the
streets’ – or something to this effect’’.56 The export of all currency
was suddenly prohibited and recruiters or traders leaving the island were
thoroughly harassed at customs and subject to intrusive searches. Even
though their money was well hidden, small fortunes were confiscated by the
Spanish nationalists.57 Traders stopped trading and as a result the British
ferry lines cut off their services to Santa Isabel, a withdrawal that ‘‘presented
the canoe owners with a practical [transport] monopoly, of which they have
not been slow to take advantage’’.58 For non-Spanish recruiters and braceros,
half of their fee and wage was paid in British money, and some £2,000
a month were finally earmarked for the Curaduria in Santa Isabel in 1938.
The recruiting networks sprung back, and profits rose because there was no
53. British Vice-Consul to the Resident of Calabar Province, 13 September 1934.
54. Only 50 ‘‘permits of return’’ were issued in 1936, and by 1939 the British Vice-Consul was
issuing 150 a month; British Vice-Consul to the Resident of Calabar Province, 14 January 1939,
TNA, PRO, CO, 554/119/5.
55. Cámara to GG, 1 April 1937, C-81/08129, E-2; Junta de Importación y Exportación to GG,
22 May 1937, AGA, C-81/08056, E-1. For a thorough overview see William Gervase Clarence-
Smith, ‘‘The Impact of the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War on Portuguese and
Spanish Africa’’, Journal of African History, 26 (1985), pp. 309–326.
56. Yapp, ‘‘Report On Employment of British Coloured Labour’’, 17 September 1936. As a
result of the Liberia Treaty and to make immigration more attractive, the Labour Code sti-
pulated that half the wages of foreign workers were to be paid in sterling.
57. British Vice-Consul to British Legation, Monrovia, 11 July 1938, TNA, PRO, CO 554/114/10.
58. Michie, ‘‘Labour Conditions in Spanish Guinea’’ (28 February 1941).
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expensive paperwork to pay for on the canoes and because wartime Spanish
monetary policy had intensified the labour shortage.
The recruiting fee represented a clear leap in income and social mobility,
which is why ‘‘every labourer who has completed his first term of contract
[was] a potential recruiter. Frequently also the older hands [on the planta-
tions were] given advances in sterling to pay for recruiting expenses’’.59 Back
in Nigeria, recruitment paths were shaped through kinship ties and the
ethnically redefined immigrant associations proliferating in urban areas.
These ‘‘home-town’’ associations served many extended community needs.
They were always, for example, the first port of call for new arrivals seeking
employment opportunities.60
Almost all recruits were Owerri Igbo or Southern Ibibio from the ‘‘palm
oil belt’’ provinces, where land scarcity was acute and the population density
was one of the highest in Africa. In the 1930s Calabar Province contained a
little over 1 million people, while some 2 million lived in Owerri and
subsistence levels were nowhere very high. Palm, and increasingly cassava,
the main cash crops, were grown in between food crops on family farms. In
colonial cartographic categories, in some of the districts of eastern Nigeria
there were over 100 ‘‘taxable males per square mile’’, as opposed to
approximately a single 1 per square mile in Rio Muni.61
The reasons for migration are portrayed in the general and regionally
specific literature, as well as often by migrants themselves, around two
poles, a liberal and ethnographic narrative and a Marxist and materialist
storyline. On the one hand, there is the genre of Wanderlust, of adven-
turous youth propping up exchange and prestige value with the eventual
aim to ‘‘deproletarianize’’ and reintegrate into home communities, but
at a step up. On the other hand, there are the constant reminders of
the struggle of the poverty-stricken upon whom responsibility falls for
covering payments such as taxes and bridewealth.62 After the invasion by
59. Ibid.; Casa Drumen to GG, 21 October 1938, C-81/08126 E-1.
60. W.T. Morrill, ‘‘Immigrants and Associations: The Ibo in Twentieth Century Calabar’’,
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 5 (1963), pp. 424–448; Richard Henderson,
‘‘Generalized Cultures and Evolutionary Adaptability: A Comparison of Urban Efik and Ibo in
Nigeria’’, Ethnology, 5 (1966), pp. 365–391; Howard Wolpe, Urban Politics in Nigeria: A Study
of Port Harcourt (Berkeley, CA, 1974), pp. 56–81; Brown, We Were All Slaves, pp. 182–187.
61. Martin, Palm Oil and Protest, pp. 90–96. For the overlap in recruitment in Owerri and
Bende for the Enugu mines, which in this period employed some 2,400 workers, see Brown, We
Were All Slaves, pp. 155–160.
62. Segun Osoba, ‘‘The Phenomenon of Labour Migration in the Era of British Colonial Rule:
A Neglected Aspect of Nigeria’s Social History’’, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 4
(1969), pp. 515–538, 524. See the editor’s introduction in Samir Amin (ed.), Modern Migrations
in Western Africa (Oxford, 1974), pp. 93–118, and Aderanti Adepoju (ed.), Internal Migration
in Nigeria (Ife, 1976). For oral history see Chima Korieh, The Land Has Changed: History,
Society and Gender in Colonial Eastern Nigeria (Calgary, AB, 2010), pp. 268–282.
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British colonial armies, the interwar period in Nigeria witnessed political
stabilization and a massive pauperization that enabled an increase in
mobility. Those who had to look outside the village economy were often
younger sons, who would be the last to receive their disappearing share of
land and whose bride-price could no longer be afforded as it had risen
to as much as £25 in some Igbo areas.63 The internal Igbo diaspora of
colonial Nigeria was enormous, numbering in the millions, and to the
long list of tenant farms, mines, trades, administrative, and urban jobs
we should append Fernando Pó. It should be noted that the cumulative
extent of migration from the eastern provinces, on the rise until the 1970s,
has largely been forgotten.
The Igbo recruiters came in much smaller groups than the more
QJ;professionalized Calabar recruiters, and in the many testimonies of Igbo
recruits available in the archives most said they had come ‘‘with a relative’’.64
That would mean someone from the same village group, although if an
individual had already worked elsewhere in Nigeria and been perceived as a
‘‘foreigner’’ kinship terms would encompass much larger groupings.
Migrants would usually have to walk, but with the recruiter’s advanced
fee, buses, trains, and canoes were used to reach Oron, from where the
ocean-going canoes would sail in convoys to the island. Each canoe could
seat up to forty people, including the ten paddlers, and carry several tons
of contraband goods. The logistics of this traffic were managed almost
exclusively by the Efik of the Cross River Delta.65
The Efik recruiters and the towns of Calabar
While the recruiters were setting up their trade, the governor generals, the
Spanish embassies, and the Cámara initiated, but unsuccessfully, labour
treaties intended to bring indentured labour from India (1928, 1947),
China (1928), Indonesia (1928), Morocco (1929), Romania (1929), São
Tomé (1929, 1931), Cameroon (1934), Congo (1945), Haiti (1934, 1949),
from Liberia again (1949), and persistently from Angola (1930, 1939,
1945, 1952).66 Personalized recruitment was more reliable and cheaper
63. Martin, Palm Oil and Protest, p. 100.
64. In the Curaduria and police files at AGA there are over 100 witness statements about
numerous incidents in which Nigerian labourers were always initially asked to give details of
their route and arrival.
65. Michie, ‘‘Labour Conditions in Spanish Guinea’’ (28 February 1941). The journey took
thirty-six hours. Oron was a small fishing village that became an important trading centre, with
local fishermen selling many large ocean-going canoes; Ekong E. Ekong, Sociology of the Ibibio:
A Study of Social Organization and Change (Ibadan, 1983), p. 92.
66. Most of these far-fetched plans were false starts, while others crumbled, for numerous
reasons, at the outset or after being signed. The archive is filled with un-histories of a stan-
dardized global indentured labour market. Even until the 1960s, Spanish Guinea was desperate
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than the lump sums prescribed by indentured labour treaties. Already, in
the early 1930s, the Fernandino R. Barleycorn had a regular supply of
workers brought by Money Ekambi and King Ndumbe from Douala on
their launch.67 At the same time, the British firm Ambas Bay used its
launch to bring workers from the rubber plantations in Calabar paid for
by the Cámara.68 The main German planter on the island, W.A. Moritz,
was provided with workers from the plantation of a family friend located
near Mount Cameroon.69 According to the testimony of one ‘‘Freeboy
Calabar’’, the important Fernandino planter J.W. Dougan was supplied
with large numbers of workers from the Eyamba ward in Calabar.70
The professionalized recruiters were predominantly Efik and they
brought over Ibibio and Igbo canvassed by the riverside markets of their
hinterland and, certainly at first, the surplus of slave descendants from
their own towns. The word Efik literally means ‘‘oppressor’’ in the Ibibio
languages, of which the Efik language is a dialectical group. It is no surprise
that most of the dedicated recruiters lived in Calabar and Umuahia
near Bende,71 for between those two towns was a well-worn trading
route along Enyong Creek, the main tributary of the Cross River that
connects Itu, Bende, and Afikbo, all of which had had large slave markets.
In the late eighteenth century the route became one of the main arteries
of the Atlantic slave trade that poured out of Old Calabar, until the
British government restrained its own slave traders.72 By the mid-nineteenth
to disentangle itself from complete dependency on Nigeria and continued to pursue indentured
labour treaties throughout the world, asking for at least 10,000 workers on 5-year contracts. See
AMAE, R 887 E-52, R 3215 E-56; AGA, C-81/08095, C-81/08147, C-81/12373; and Max
Liniger-Goumaz, ‘‘La cuestión bracera. Ciento cincuenta de búsqueda de mano de obra en
Guinea Ecuatorial’’, Estudios de Asia y Africa, 22 (1987), pp. 497–534.
67. The Resident of Cameroons Province to GG, 31 October 1931, AGA, C-81/08146, E-1.
68. Curaduria, 3 November 1932, C-81/08125, E-4; Cámara to GG, 16 December 1930,
81/08095, E-18.
69. German planters in Cameroon complained of the ‘‘efforts of Fernando Poo’s planters,
to whisk away our workers’’; see Westafrican Plantation Company Victoria to Kemner,
20 May 1926, Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde [BArch], R 1001/3504.
70. Curaduria, 6 June 1932, C-81/08126, E-21. Members of the Eyamba family, from the most
commercially and politically powerful lineage of Calabar, had settled on Fernando Pó in the late
nineteenth century; Ivor Miller, Voice of the Leopard: African Secret Societies and Cuba
(Jackson, MS, 2009), p. 128. For the rise of the free marketeers of the Eyamba ward at
the expense of the ‘‘landed interests’’ of Duke Town, see Patrick Manning, ‘‘Slave Trade,
‘Legitimate’ Trade, and Imperialism Revisited: The Control of Wealth in the Bights of Benin
and Biafra’’, in Paul E. Lovejoy (ed.), Africans in Bondage: Studies in Slavery and the Slave
Trade (Madison, WI, 1986), pp. 203–233.
71. List of forty known recruiters in Michie, ‘‘Labour Conditions in Spanish Guinea’’
(28 February 1941); list of another forty recruiters and hundreds of canoe paddlers in Policia
Colonial, 12 December 1942, AGA C-81/15865, E-12.
72. For the role of the Aro traders and the failed abolition along the same route, see G. Ugo
Nwokeji, The Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra: An African Society in the Atlantic
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century the seven Efik towns had a slave population of 95 per cent, and
it was they who produced food surpluses and operated the canoes trans-
porting palm oil.73
Duke Town had grown to be the wealthiest Efik town due its advan-
tageous location on the Cross River. Duke Town was called Old Calabar
by British merchants and was the site of the first British missionary
establishments and later the capital of the Southern Nigeria Protectorate.
In the years following World War I, with the construction of a railway
from Enugu to Port Harcourt, extensive road building, the emergence
of small-scale Igbo bicycle traders, and the market occupation by a
handful of European import-export firms, the hitherto obligatory eco-
nomic passage point of Calabar was eclipsed. Merchants from the coastal
trading groups found themselves virtually transformed from ‘‘wealthy
entrepreneurs to petty traders’’.74
While a large proportion of Efiks were employed in colonial admin-
istration or in British mercantile firms across Nigeria, for others with a
status less guaranteed by the quid pro quo of colonial rule, the only choice
was to continue to deploy their canoes and reposition themselves as
middlemen in new markets.75 The Efik gentry who had maintained their
wealth invested in urban property, acquired lorries, and ‘‘owned most of
the canoes that plied the river and sold most of the spirits that were found
in the market’’.76 The new sources of income from recruitment were
accompanied by downward social mobility of low-caste Efiks, who
aspired in the opposite direction from agricultural labour, which was
World (New York, 2010); Adiele E. Afigbo, The Abolition of the Slave Trade in Southeastern
Nigeria, 1885–1950 (Rochester, NY, 2006), pp. 33, 156. British merchants continued to dock in
Old Calabar for palm oil; see Martin Lynn, Commerce and Economic Change in West Africa:
The Palm Oil Trade in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 37, 61.
73. Slaves continued to be sourced from districts such as Bende and Uyo; Rosalind Hackett,
Religion in Calabar: The Religious Life and History of a Nigerian Town (Berlin, 1989),
pp. 20–30; Geoffrey Johnston, Of God and Maxim Guns: Presbyterianism in Nigeria,
1846–1966 (Waterloo, ONT, 1988), p. 275. For an overview of the extensive and classic lit-
erature on the history of the Efiks, see Paul E. Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery: A History
of Slavery in Africa (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 102–104, 187–189.
74. Anthony Nwabughuogu, ‘‘From Wealthy Entrepreneurs to Petty Traders: The Decline of
African Middlemen in Eastern Nigeria, 1900–1950’’, Journal of African History, 23 (1982),
pp. 365–379. This powerful middleman status was lost by many coastal groups across much of
West and Central Africa.
75. Adiele E. Afigbo, The Warrant Chiefs: Indirect Rule in Southeastern Nigeria, 1891–1929
(New York, 1972), pp. 27–31. D. Simmons, ‘‘An Ethnographic Sketch of the Efik People’’, in
Daryll Forde (ed.), Efik Traders of Old Calabar (London, 1956), pp. 1–26.
76. Nwabughuogu, ‘‘From Wealthy Entrepreneurs to Petty Traders’’, p. 369. For the famous
‘‘canoe-houses’’ west of Calabar, see Patrick Manning, ‘‘Merchants, Porters, and Canoemen in
the Bight of Benin’’, in Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch and Paul E. Lovejoy (eds), The Workers
of African Trade (Thousand Oaks, CA [etc.], 1985), pp. 51–74.
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heavily stigmatized as work for slaves. While he was in Santa Isabel, an
Efik recruiter named Ben Bassey submitted a letter of complaint to the
British Vice-Consul:
On Tuesday I happened to meet my younger brother unexpectedly in the street.
I requested how they manage to come here. I was to understand that they were
brought here by one trader [known as the ‘‘Dahomey woman’’] who deceived
them that they will be employed as shop-boys on Fonda-sellers [African
grocery store]. On this account the children followed her. But now she wishes
to sign them in the farm. They are boys and do no farm work because they were
in school all the time.77
The most competitive side of Efik social organization emerged from the
internal dynamics of the Ekpe society. This politico-religious organiza-
tion spanned all seven towns, all men could and were pressured to be
members, and wealth accumulated from trading was the primary criterion
for determining status. A large sum of money was required to rise higher
than the ‘‘young adult’’ rank of the first two gradients, a rank which also
tended to mark the upper limit of membership for individuals from for-
mer slave families.78 Above that was the ‘‘middle-management’’ level of
monetized membership that was central in propelling recruitment, as
ambitious Ekpe members could draw upon the patronage of and hire the
canoes owned by the wealthy elite. Even the Ekpe society’s musicians
propagated or at least ideologically reflected recruitment, as the lyrics of
an Ekpe chant attest: ‘‘You say you are unemployed, if you are jobless let’s
go to Panya’’.79
The hierarchical networks of labour mobilization that were organized
from Calabar came into competition with the much more decentralized
recruitment activities of Igbo former labourers and petty traders. The
emerging economic prominence of Igbo migrants in Calabar was met with
hostility, even to the point of a spate of public attacks on the ‘‘foreigners’’.80
In light of that competition, but only after the eruption of a media scandal
77. Ben Bassey to British Vice-Consul, 2 December 1935, TNA, PRO CO 554/105/3;
British Vice-Consul to the Resident of Calabar Province, 15 January 1936, TNA, PRO, CO
554/105/3.
78. Daniel A. Offiong, ‘‘The Functions of the Ekpo Society of the Ibibio of Nigeria’’, African
Studies Review, 27 (1984), pp. 77–92, 80. For the different composition of the ‘‘leopard’’ society
in Annang country around Ikot Ekpene, which was also called ‘‘Ekpe’’, see Pratten, Man-
Leopard Murders.
79. Panya was the Pidgin rendering of España or Spanish Guinea, cited in Miller, Voice of the
Leopard, p. 128. The song was recorded in Calabar in 1982, by which time the Ekpe society had
been largely reduced to recreational and entertainment activities.
80. Pratten, Man-Leopard Murders, p. 194. For the settings of urban economic politics see Ute
Röschenthaler, ‘‘A ‘New York City of Ibibioland’? Local Historiography and Power Conflict
in Calabar’’, in Axel Harneit-Sievers (ed.), A Place in the World: New Local Historiographies
from Africa and South Asia (Leiden, 2002), pp. 87–110.
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that sought to break the traffic, L.O. Esien Offiong wrote to the Governor
of Fernando Pó, proposing that as a
[y] retired member of the Nigerian civil service [y] belong[ing] to the
Eyamba House, of the ruling houses in Calabar [he would be] qualified as an
experienced and responsible man to run a Labour Recruiting Organisation in
Nigeria [which would] remove the abuses, unpleasantness and inconvenience
caused by the unlawful system of canoe recruiting and solve finally the labour
problem in Fernando Po.81
Shanghaiing, brandy, and World War II
Esien Offiong’s proposal was rejected by the Spanish Governor, while cases
of ‘‘shanghaiing’’ – a quintessentially British imperial term for being kid-
napped to work offshore – shocked the Nigerian media. In Britain, the
scandal echoed its way into all major newspapers and even into the House
of Commons, and numerous letters of concern were dropped through the
letter box of the Colonial Secretary in London by the Anti-Slavery Society.
The Nigerian Eastern Mail sparked the controversy in an exposé of
[y] the smugglers posing daily at Oron as canoe ferry men [in which] travellers
run the risk of unknowingly falling into the hands of the ‘‘slave dealers’’. [y]
It is to be deplored that this wicked practice should have been resuscitated
by those who thought they could eke out an existence at the expense of the
freedom of others.82
The recruits were variously described by Nigerian journalists as ‘‘unem-
ployed and down and outs’’, ‘‘innocent and unsophisticated Africans’’
‘‘belonging to the lower walks of life’’, who were ‘‘inveigled’’, ‘‘tricked
and bamboozled’’, ‘‘lured – in most cases actually kidnapped by agents
who thought of nothing else but the prospect of earning the promised
commission on the transaction’’.83
It is quite certain that at least 10 to 15 per cent of Nigerian braceros on
the island had ‘‘been taken there without their being willing to go there’’.
That figure was estimated by Timothy Farley Smith, a colonial admin-
istrator from Nigeria sent to investigate labour conditions on the island
after the media scandal. He arrived at his estimate after ‘‘listening to
complaints and making inquiries on the Island’’ and he even excluded
81. L.O. Esien Offiong to GG, 14 June 1939, AGA C-81/08131.
82. ‘‘The Nigerian Eastern Mail Alleges Slavery in Oron’’, The West African Pilot, 21 January
1939; newspaper clippings in TNA, PRO, CO 554/114/10.
83. Shepherd, ‘‘Nigerian Labourers in Fernando Po’’; ‘‘The Fernando Po Slave Traffic’’, The
Nigerian Eastern Mail, 25 February 1939; ‘‘Matters of Moment, by Observer’’, The Nigerian
Daily Times, 15 July 1939. For further bad press, with commentators and student groups even
calling for an invasion of the island, see Bolaji Akinyemi, ‘‘Nigeria and Fernando Poo,
1958–1966: The Politics of Irridentism’’, African Affairs, 69 (1970), pp. 236–249.
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from it those ‘‘for whom it is natural that having gone willingly and
finding they do not like the conditions make as good a story as possible in
their efforts to return to Nigeria before completing their contracts’’. From
Farley Smith’s impression, only
[y] in isolated cases have recruiters been able to lure fully grown men into
going to Fernando Po without their knowing that they were going there, but
I am certain that the recruiters have induced a considerable number of youths to
leave their homes on promises of work in Nigeria or the Cameroons under
British Mandate and have taken them to the Island. The usual procedure is to
bring the recruits at night down to some small village on the coast or creeks of
Calabar province and tell them that in order to get to their destination they have
to cross a wide river. [y] The recruits then embark in the canoes and next
morning they are well out at sea and it is too late for them to be able to take any
action to get away from the recruiter.84
Between the canoe owners and the planters on the island there was
another set of dedicated intermediaries taking their slice by acting
as translators and managers of the recruits. In the words of the most
infamous reclutadora, the ‘‘Dahomey woman [who the Consul was told]
by various Calabar natives here, [was] a notorious recruiter’’, would act
‘‘as a counsellor and friend to the boys in their journey to Fernando
Poo’’.85 Louisa Sousa, or the ‘‘Dahomey woman [was] regularly going to
Nigeria by canoe’’ and she continuously reappears in the archive as
one of a large handful of shanghaiing culprits. One of her victims
was Friday Akpan, whose complaint was pithily transcribed by the
British Consul:
I was brought here six months ago by a canoeman named Godwin of Abak,
Uyo Division. I asked to him to take me to Calabar to join my brother Christian
Nkere, but he took me here and handed me to Serra [a large Portuguese planter
in San Carlos whose labour manager was Louisa Sousa]. I have not been paid for
three months. I went to a farm and reported my trouble to my relative. I was
caught there and sent to prison. I am still in the prison. My employer said that
she paid a fat sum to Godwin and that I am her slave.86
In Calabar there were ‘‘huge public notices warning Natives against
going to Fernando Po’’ that highlighted the risk of canoes being capsized by
tornadoes near the island’s shark-infested waters.87 The newspapers pressed
84. Farley Smith, 21 September 1939.
85. British Vice-Consul to the Resident of Calabar Province, 15 January 1936, TNA, PRO, CO
554/105/3.
86. Consul General to Governor of Nigeria, 3 March 1943; ‘‘General Report No. 3 on Situation
in Fernando Po’’, TNA, PRO, FO 371/34772; British Consul to Consul General, 30 November
1944; ‘‘Native Labour, Monthly Report’’, TNA, PRO, FO 371/49598.
87. British Vice-Consul to the Resident of Calabar Province, 14 January 1939, TNA, PRO, CO
554/114/10.
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both governments ‘‘to accelerate action against this abominable canoe
traffic, in order that some plan be formulated whereby Nigerians could
travel like human beings, and not after the manner of sacks of palm
kernels’’.88 In the summer of 1939, during his inspection tour of Fernando
Pó, Farley Smith had already initiated the meticulous drafting of a labour
treaty in accordance with the recently ratified ILO conventions. But with
the outbreak of World War II the incipient canoe traffic, which the new
treaty had aimed to replace, turned into a bazaar-like bonanza.
The smuggling of labourers had become embedded in the increasingly
profitable contraband trade, where ‘‘anyone, with enough money to hire a
canoe and paddlers [went] into this business. [y] There is no one central
organisation, the smuggling is almost universal’’. Those allegedly involved
in smuggling were ‘‘the rank and file of police, customs and immigration
officers, [who] are exposed to enormous temptation’’, as well as ‘‘Senior
Police, Europeans and prominent Africans’’.89 The smuggling was an
open secret hovering across colonial Calabar. A contemporary anthro-
pologist, undertaking fieldwork in Eket, noted that her informants were
‘‘extremely reluctant to reveal their true incomes, [y] to reveal certain
illegal sources of revenue, notably Brandy smuggling from Fernando
Po’’.90 The ‘‘Santa Isabel–Oron–Calabar traffic in contraband goods [went
on to become] the heaviest along the coast of Nigeria and indeed of West
Africa’’.91 During World War II, the island was wholly dependent on
Nigeria for foodstuffs and other vital commodities such as pesticides,
petrol, and motorcycles, while barrels of palm oil and rubber were even
re-exported to Spain. In exchange, all sorts of Spanish goods were brought
back on the canoes, but the bulk of the return cargo was brandy.
Thousands of crates found their way into all corners of Nigeria.92
88. Shepherd, ‘‘Nigerian Labourers in Fernando Po’’.
89. Commissioner of Police to Governor of Nigeria, ‘‘Illicit Traffic between Nigeria and
Fernando Po’’, 2 June 1944, TNA, PRO, FO 371/39661.
90. Anne Martin, The Oil Palm Economy of the Ibibio Farmer (Ibadan, 1956), p. 17. Brandy,
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The chief of the Calabar police, investigating the labour trafficking, had
good reason to claim that there was ‘‘great difficulty in enlisting the help
and cooperation’’ of the public.93 Calabar was the site of the first Nigerian
naval base, established there expressly to stop illegal recruitment and
liquor smuggling, as customs revenues from alcohol constituted the
golden lining of the colonial treasury. However, no patrol launches were
available until the final years of World War II, and in any case they were
ineffective in stamping out the canoe convoys, which would scatter in all
directions if pursued. The canoe operators came to know the timetable of
the naval patrols – so they set off only when the launch was being
refuelled! Furthermore, the innumerable twisty creeks of the Cross River
Delta were impossible to police, and even if they did catch the smugglers
‘‘the four naval officers [found it] difficult to take up to 40 Africans in
belligerent mood aboard the vessel’’.94 The British Empire controlled the
eastern Atlantic, and even throughout World War II the vast shipping
routes were regulated by sailing permissions or ‘‘navicerts’’, but imperial
ticketing systems were powerless in the Bight of Biafra.
The labour treaty agency, blood papers, and reenganchos
Meanwhile, Farley Smith’s labour treaty was being drafted and re-drafted,
before finally being signed by the British and Spanish colonial authorities
in December 1942.95 The attempt to redraw, standardize, and supervise
the recruitment trajectory involved the construction of an obligatory
passage point for all labour intermediaries. All contract formalities and
medical tests would be processed by the British authorities before
boarding. The John Holt Company in Calabar was put in charge of hiring
licensed recruiters, under the ‘‘newspeak’’ organizational name of the
‘‘Anglo-Spanish Agency for Contracting and Protecting Calabar
Labourers’’.96 The agency set out to become a monopoly, but it had scant
p. 187. And for how much was at stake in terms of colonial revenues, see especially Chima J.
Korieh, ‘‘Alcohol and Empire: ‘Illicit’ Gin Prohibition and Control in Colonial Eastern
Nigeria’’, African Economic History, 31 (2003), pp. 111–134, 119.
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the memoir of a marine officer, P.J. Odu, The Future That Vanished: A Biafra Story (n.p., 2009),
p. 70: ‘‘I never once caught a smuggler’’.
95. Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria and Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea, ‘‘Treaty
Regarding the Recruitment in Nigeria of Native Labourers for Working in the Spanish Terri-
tories of the Gulf of Guinea’’, 9 December 1942; available online at: http://treaties.un.org/doc/
Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%20205/v205.pdf (last accessed 15 April 2012). For the long
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success as the recruiters circumvented the new requirements of the treaty,
which prohibited individual planters from paying premiums. Even one
official licensed recruiter stationed in Opobo, handing out flyers with
pictures of model plantations, would bring the recruits to Sambo Ekpo, a
canoe operator in Oron, instead of to the agency’s transit camp.97 For the
first few years only around 150 monthly work contracts were overseen by
the agency, and it was only in the late 1950s that braceros brought in
under the new arrangements began to outnumber illegally recruited
workers.98
The treaty’s first article, which was also its stated aim, prohibited those
arriving outside the protocols of the treaty from being placed under
contract. However, those already working on the island before the treaty
was signed could renew their contracts, although the majority did not.99
Those finishing their contracts turned to trading or left the island and sold
their Spanish medical examination results or ‘‘blood papers’’ to the
counterfeit dealers in Calabar. With those ‘‘blood papers’’, the new
recruits arriving clandestinely on canoes would start working under false
names as re-contracted pre-treaty labourers. While many of those arriving
saved themselves the trouble and claimed they had set off from the French
Cameroons, for those reenganchos (officially under a second contract)
the wages were 60 pesetas a month, twice that of braceros under a first,
or a treaty contract.100 The increase in pay had been put in place to
prolong the contracts of workers who were already familiar with the
labour-intensive procedures of cacao production, which entailed constant
R.E. Mabale (eds), The Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea Transborder Cooperation (Lagos, 1995),
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98. British Consul to Consulate General, 6 July 1943, TNA, PRO, FO 371/34772; Esteban
Hanza to GG, June 1962, AGA, C-81/08214 E-1.
99. Wolff, ‘‘Ein Beitrag zur Wirtschaft von Fernando Poo’’, p. 98. Wolff was stuck in Fernando
Pó at the outbreak of World War II, and he wrote that ‘‘usually the Gastarbeiter returned home
with three to five pounds in savings’’. Spanish officials used the resulting statistically high
recontracting rate as ‘‘proof’’ of the good working conditions.
100. Some planters even offered a lump-sum bonus, a real regalo, for recontracting for another
two years. In 1944, it was 1,000 pesetas or £20, higher that the first two years of wages; British
Labour Officer at Fernando Po to Consul General, 26 May 1944, TNA, PRO, FO 371/39661.
Food rations, housing, and health costs were covered by the plantation owners. Living expenses
were very low compared with the cost of living in Nigerian cities and towns. There were also
many opportunities by which workers could increase their income. It was very common for
Nigerian braceros to sell a combination of their imported food rations as well as any bush-meat,
river crabs, and fruits gathered from the shadow trees planted alongside the cacao. That was the
main reason why an employer near the road or town was much to be preferred.
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clearing of vegetation, maintenance of plant nurseries, transplanting
seedlings, spraying trees with sulphate, estimating ripeness, harvesting
cacao pods with long-handled sickles, fermenting and drying the fruit,
and classifying and bagging the beans.
Forgery of second contracts was what kept illegal recruitment going, as
without the reengancho bonuses wages on the island were, by the end of
World War II, lower than in Nigeria, as ‘‘due to army separation allow-
ances and the present food produce prices, there [was] plenty of money in
circulation and it [was] possible for a labourer to earn a favourable living
locally’’.101 Planters regularly used the contracts of braceros who had died
to sign up clandestine recruits under false names.102 On the surface, the
Curaduria had to have its paperwork appropriately ordered to accom-
modate the Treaty’s stipulations and the British Consul’s inspections. By
1945 the Calabar police had arrested hundreds of smugglers, and at the
[y] Nigerian end, the labour smuggling [that remained was] in the hands of a
chosen few, [among whom was] the Dahomey woman, who [was still] notorious
as a smuggler of labour and contraband goods, [y] as is the case on the Island
where the traffic [was] controlled entirely by about 3 persons with the full
knowledge and connivance of Officials in High Authority.
It was both the chief of the Spanish police and his brother the labour
officer whom a handful of the most important recruiters had in their
pockets.103 As the supply of ‘‘blood papers’’ was dwindling, Sebastian
Llompart Aulet (the labour officer until the 1960s), would, for a 50-peseta
bribe, stamp forged contracts that made it appear that the new recruits
were re-contracting. ‘‘As with the smuggling of contraband goods, the
sum of 1000 pesetas is collected by the chief of police and 500 pesetas by
the owner of the beach where the canoes arrive’’, who would also take the
recruits ‘‘over to San Carlos for distribution’’.104
Polite requests – almost amounting to injunctions – to shut down illegal
recruitment were made by the British Consul in almost every communication
with Spanish officials. The Cámara would of course point to the inevitability
and indispensability of the clandestine recruiters, as ‘‘the supply of labour is
101. F. Shepherd to British Consul, 6 December 1944, AGA, C-81/08130, E-1. The official
wage on Fernando Pó until 1946 was 30 pesetas, or 14 shillings, 6 shillings short of £1.
102. Fernando Garcı́a Gimeno, Fernando el africano (Madrid, 2004), pp. 45–50. This is the
memoir of a humble and unpretentious Spanish settler who spoke ‘‘Pichinglish’’ and who,
between 1950 and 1964, managed 600 Nigerian braceros at any one time for several Portuguese
and Bubi planters.
103. British Consul to Consul General, 30 December 1944, TNA, PRO, FO 371/49598.
104. British Consul to Consul General, 23 July 1944, TNA, PRO, FO 371/39661. The supply
chain was geared towards the remote San Carlos and to the large Fernandino and Portuguese
planters, who had been cut out by the official recruitment channels which prioritized Spanish
planters.
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far less than the demand [y and besides] Nigeria is overpopulated’’. To make
its point quite blatantly, in 1945 the Cámara petitioned the British Consul to
increase the Treaty quota from 400 labourers a month to 1,200 for the island
in addition to a further 3,400 monthly contracts needed for the projected
growth of logging works and coffee plantations in Rio Muni, and signed off
with an impertinent bottom line of 55,000 braceros per year.105
C O N C L U S I O N – A G E N C Y, M E D I AT O R S , A N D
I N T E R M E D I A R I E S
The basic lesson in economics given to the Consul by the Cámara should
not be mistaken for a conclusive hypothesis for the underlying explana-
tion as to why clandestine recruiters enjoyed such success in the Bight of
Biafra. The single cause of exploitation and efficiency is formulated by
experts through a variety of legitimated formulae, and only then can
labour surplus/scarcity be seen as a wave ‘‘simply transported without
deformation through a chain of intermediaries’’.
To study empirically the metrics of capitalism-imperialism, it can be
helpful to abandon the contrivances of Marxist schemata and the idea of
roaming but placeless homines economici. Replacing those with the actual
toil of constant action and constant connection, without which the con-
torted landscapes of history would not have come into existence, allows
for a precise account of the delicate and brutally imposed contours of
world-systemic economic trajectories. Only once a great many material
instruments and ideological scripts have been mobilized can a configured
network give the impression of being either something ‘‘local’’ or a
durable global structure commanding predictable intermediaries to do its
bidding.106 ANT provides the methodological tools to unfold structures,
flatten the global, and to disperse or ‘‘dislocalize’’ action. By following the
procedures of ANT we are led to the conceptual dissolution of binary
pairs and of the manifold sociological compromises – their ‘‘dialectical
mutual constitution’’, or their ‘‘interdependence’’ – that keeps them intact.
The single scope and object of analysis in Latourian ANT is the actor-
mediator, or ‘‘actant’’, which transports and translates a network that is
105. British Consul to Cámara, 20 October 1948, AGA, C-81/08124, E-1; Consul General to
Governor of Nigeria, 12 February 1945, ‘‘Native Labour, Monthly Report, No. 12’’, TNA,
PRO, FO 371/49598. At this time about one-third of the still comparatively smaller workforce
in Rio Muni was from Nigeria.
106. Latour, Reassembling the Social, pp. 60, 204. For this line of post-structuralist thinking,
where ‘‘movements and displacements come first, places and shapes second’’, and that should
not easily be dismissed as a mere symptom of the neoliberal World Wide Web ‘‘age’’ but treated
as a theory of history that diverges scientifically and politically from the critical style of
analysing ‘‘global capitalism’’, see also J.K. Gibson-Graham, The End of Capitalism (As We
Knew It): A Feminist Critique of Political Economy (Minneapolis, MI, 2006).
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always on site, being performed, stabilized, undermined, or reconstructed.
As noted in Graham Harman’s wonderful book on Latour, for Latour
there exist only more or less powerful actants. In the autonomy- and
resistance-defined notion of agency, agency is a human privilege that lies
below a constraining structure. However, if power, structure, and agency
are released from humanisms and dualisms and are said to be distributed
throughout a socio-technical network, it does not mean that they are
diffuse or horizontal.
The braceros were literally surrounded, and even though they had to
enter into and go through what could be described as the ordeal of
colonial modernity, they never lost the ability to move and to become
mediators themselves. In Rio Muni, the theft of regalos, flight, and border
crossing eventually led to the abolition of the whole wage-regalo
recruiting arrangement. Nigerian braceros increased their share of wealth
produced in the Spanish colony by unflinchingly supplying markets
with second-hand documents and contraband commodities. It was their
initiative to bring to official attention the abuses of the recruiters
by submitting complaints to the Consul and by exposing stories to
journalists, and therefore of creating the traces that populate the archives.
A good critique of ANT is that it tends to protagonize exceptional actors
and ‘‘winners’’, such as colonialists or recruiters, as their victory depends on
being part of the dominant associations that leave behind the most traces
and sources.107 The colonial economic project could spread by aggressive
force and maps of battlefields, through plenary imperial mandates and
administrative paperwork or in racist and intimidating legal-symbolic status
regimes. Within geo-imperial coordinates the activities of Fernando Pó’s
recruiters working with their allies, compatibilities and preconditions
could unfold, specifically through, in Rio Muni, Fang gender and status
hierarchies, bridewealth, and peseta coinage; and in Nigeria through the
logistical infrastructure of merchants in Calabar, the legacies of the Atlantic
slave trade, and the relentless cutting of prices in the palm-product market.
The position of the clandestine recruiters as indispensable and quite
durable relay points for the mobilization of labour across the Bight of
Biafra was meticulously created by a long list of mediators which cannot
be disentangled and formalized into the purified combinatory matrix
characteristic of structuralist social theory. Rather, in a diagrammatic
107. For a critically sympathetic view see Graham Harman, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour
and Metaphysics (Melbourne, VIC, 2009). Apart from Latour’s work, Harman’s book has been
the most inspiring for an attempt at ANT-inflected historical social science research, although
the British branch of ANT is more closely associated with illuminating the operations of
imperial expansion. See, for example, John Law, ‘‘On the Methods of Long Distance Control:
Vessels, Navigation and the Portuguese Route to India’’, in idem (ed.), Power, Action and Belief:
A New Sociology of Knowledge? (London, 1986), pp. 234–263.
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fashion, to deploy themselves, the labour intermediaries aligned with the
organizational standards of and translations between kinship, ethnicity,
money, gender, psychology, law, bureaucracy, religion, war, commodities,
and so on.
The composition of the recruitment trajectories partially followed up
on in this article included: subsidized Spanish chocolate; the currencies
deemed acceptable for paying bridewealth; police uniforms; the control of
wealth by chiefs; regalos and the colonial state’s currency and price reg-
ulations; the structure of the contract; the ability to make false promises
and convincingly deceive; the fraternal relations between the Spanish
police chief and the labour officer; the documentation required for
boarding ships and taking up contracts; IOUs; bombs bought with for-
eign exchange reserves dropped by the Francoists in Madrid; bottles of
brandy; home-town associations; the organization of Ekpe membership;
forged second contracts; and the one navy vessel that was transporting
Nigerian soldiers during World War II instead of patrolling the Cross
River Delta.
It was within these serialized mediators, not adjacent to some sort of
wider context or below pre-produced structures or somewhere outside
the concrete, that the recruiters organized a treacherous path between
capital and labour – or, with the details unfolding, between this mediated
capital and that mediated labour.
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